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Abstract
We study entry and bidding patterns in sealed bid and open auctions with heteroge-
neous bidders. Using data from U.S. Forest Service timber auctions, we document a set
of systematic e⁄ects of auction format: sealed bid auctions attract more small bidders,
shift the allocation towards these bidders, and can also generate higher revenue. We
show that a private value auction model with endogenous participation can account for
these qualitative e⁄ects of auction format. We estimate the model￿ s parameters and
show that it can explain the quantitative e⁄ects as well. Finally, we use the model to
provide an assessment of bidder competitiveness, which has important consequences
for auction choice.
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The relative performance of open and sealed bid auctions is a central issue in auction
design. The choice between these auction formats arises frequently: in allocating natural
resources, in procurement, in sales of art, real estate and other assets. The seminal result
in auction theory, Vickrey￿ s (1961) Revenue Equivalence Theorem, states that under certain
conditions the two formats have essentially equivalent equilibrium outcomes. But in practice
the assumptions of competitive risk neutral bidders with independent identically distributed
values often seem too strong. Further theoretical work shows that auction choice becomes
relevant as these assumptions are relaxed. The comparison between open and sealed bidding
then depends on both the details of the market (e.g. bidder heterogeneity, entry costs,
collusion, correlation in bidder values, risk-aversion, transaction costs) and the designer￿ s
objective (e.g. revenue maximization or e¢ ciency).
This wealth of theory cries out for empirical evidence, but it has arrived slowly. A
di¢ culty is that many real-world auction markets tend to operate under a given set of rules
rather than systematically experimenting with alternative designs. In this paper, we provide
some new evidence from sales of timber in the national forests. The U.S. Forest Service
timber program provides an excellent test case in market design as it uses both open and
sealed bidding, at times even randomizing the choice. The timber sale program is also
economically interesting in its own right. Timber logging and milling is a $100 billion a
year industry in the U.S.,1 and about 30% of timberland is publicly owned. During the time
period we study, the federal government sold about a billion dollars of timber a year.
We analyze data from open and sealed bid sales held during 1982 and 1990 in two
areas: the Idaho-Montana border and California. We document signi￿cant departures from
revenue equivalence in terms of bidder participation, allocation and prices. Conditional on
sale characteristics, sealed bid auctions induce more participation by small ￿rms that lack
manufacturing capacity (￿loggers￿ ). In contrast, entry by larger ￿rms with manufacturing
capability (￿mills￿ ) is roughly the same across auction formats. Sealed bid auctions also
are more likely to be won by loggers. Finally, we measure winning bids to be about 10%
higher in the sealed bid auctions in the Northern forests. In the California forests, the price
di⁄erence is small and statistically insigni￿cant.
Motivated by these ￿ndings, we consider a model that incorporates several salient depar-
tures from the standard independent private value auction model (the revenue equivalence
1This number is from the U.S. Census and combines forestry and logging, sawmills, and pulp and paper-
board mills (NAICS categories 113, 3221 and 321113).
1benchmark). First, we allow bidders to have heterogeneous value distributions. Second, we
explicitly model participation by assuming it is costly to acquire information and bid in the
auction. Third, because of the large price di⁄erential in the Northern forests, we entertain
the possibility that mills behave cooperatively in the open auctions. Collusion has been
a long-standing concern in timber auctions and the prevailing view is that open auctions
are more prone to bidder cooperation because participants are face-to-face and can react
immediately to opponents￿behavior.
The theoretical e⁄ect of bidder heterogeneity is well-known from the work of Maskin and
Riley (2000). In an open auction, the bidder with the highest value always wins. But in a
sealed bid auction, relatively strong bidders have greater incentive to shade their bids below
their true valuations, so a weak bidder can win despite not having the highest valuation. The
resulting distortion tips sealed bid outcomes toward weaker bidders and provides them with
an extra entry incentive. Using our bidding data, we provide sharp evidence that mills are
systematically stronger bidders, so the basic predictions of the heterogenous bidding model
concerning allocation and entry go in the same direction as our empirical ￿ndings. The theory
is less clear-cut on the relative prices in open and sealed auctions. As Maskin and Riley
observed, the comparison hinges on the model primitives: the bidders￿value distributions
and the cost of participation.
To assess whether the model can match our empirical ￿ndings about auction prices,
as well as our quantitative ￿ndings about allocation and entry, we estimate the structural
parameters of the model using data from the sealed bid auctions. We use a parametric version
of Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000) to recover the distributions of bidder values from the
observed bids. We also recover estimates of entry costs by estimating the distribution of
logger entry and combining this with the post-entry pro￿ts implied by the estimated value
distributions. We show informally and using formal speci￿cation testing that the model
provides a good ￿t to the sealed bid data. The estimates indicate substantial di⁄erences
between mills and loggers, as well as fairly low entry costs and pro￿t margins.
We then use the calibrated model to predict the outcomes of the open auctions in our
data under alternative behavioral assumptions. The predictions are out-of-sample in two
directions: we predict outcomes for di⁄erent sales and for a di⁄erent auction game than was
used in estimation. Nevertheless when we compare the model￿ s predictions to the actual
auction outcomes, we ￿nd that the model plausibly explains the observed di⁄erences in
participation and allocation across auction formats. Our baseline assumption of competitive
bidding also ￿ts the auction prices in California quite well. The competitive benchmark has
2a harder time explaining the large price di⁄erence between open and sealed bidding that we
observe in the Northern forests. Instead the data appear consistent with a mild degree of
cooperative behavior by participating mills.
The calibrated model also permits a welfare assessment of the choice between open and
sealed bid auctions. We ￿nd that for a ￿xed set of participants, the model predicts relatively
small discrepancies in outcomes. Sealed bid auctions raise more revenue, and distort the
allocation away from e¢ ciency and in favor of loggers, but the e⁄ects are small (less than
1%). The di⁄erences are somewhat larger when we account for equilibrium entry behavior:
sealed bidding increases revenue by roughly 2-5% relative to a competitive open auction due
to increased logger entry. Strikingly, even a mild degree of cooperative bidding by the mills
at open auctions ￿ the behavioral assumption most consistent with the observed outcomes
in the Northern forests ￿ results in much more substantial revenue di⁄erences (on the order
of 5-10%). This suggests that bidder competitiveness merits considerable attention in the
choice of auction format.
Our paper contributes generally to the economics of auction design, and to several more
focused literatures. In particular, a long-standing debate surrounds the format of federal
timber sales. Mead (1966) argued early on that open timber auctions generated less rev-
enue. In 1976, forests in the Paci￿c Northwest, which has historically used open auctions,
ran a number of sealed bid sales. Johnson (1979) and Hansen (1986) studied this episode
and reached con￿ icting conclusions. Johnson ￿nds higher prices in the sealed bid auctions,
while Hansen argues that the di⁄erences are insigni￿cant after accounting for sale charac-
teristics. As Hansen points out, however, the episode is not an ideal testing ground. The
choice of auction format was sensitive to lobbying, creating a potentially severe endogeneity
problem, and moreover, one might be skeptical of drawing conclusions from an unexpected
and transient episode. Subsequently, Schuster and Niccolucci (1993) and Stone and Rideout
(1997) looked, respectively, at sales in Idaho and Montana and in Colorado. Both papers ￿nd
higher revenue from sealed bid auctions. A nice feature of Schuster and Niccolucci￿ s paper
is that they exploit the often-random assignment of auction format in some of the Northern
forests. Our paper expands on this prior work by addressing a broader set of questions about
allocation and participation as well as prices, and in estimating a tightly-speci￿ed theoretical
model, but we have drawn on Schuster and Nicolucci￿ s work in constructing our sample.
Our work also relates to the empirical literature on bidder collusion. Researchers have
proposed several approaches to assess whether auction data are consistent with competitive
or collusive bidding (Porter and Zona 1993, 1999; Baldwin, Marshall, and Richard, 1997;
3Bajari, 1997; Pesendorfer, 2000; Bajari and Ye, 2003; Asker, 2008). These approaches
either require prior knowledge about the existence and structure of a cartel, or derive in-
sample speci￿cation tests of the competitive model and treat collusion as the alternative.
Our method di⁄ers in that we use behavior in one auction format as a benchmark from which
to evaluate the competitiveness of behavior under an alternative format.
Finally, our empirical approach to studying bidder participation shares features with
the industrial organization literature on entry and market structure (Bresnahan and Reiss,
1987; Berry, 1992). This literature uses entry decisions to draw inferences about pro￿t
functions relative to a normalized distribution of entry costs, as a function of market-speci￿c
covariates. In contrast, we ￿rst estimate post-entry pro￿ts from ￿rms￿pricing decisions (i.e.
their bids), and use entry decisions only to recover the sunk costs of participation. This
approach allows us to fully recover the parameters of our model in dollar terms. Bajari and
Hortacsu (2003), Li (2005), Li and Zheng (2006), and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2005) are
other recent auction studies that account for bidder participation.
2. The Theoretical Model
This section develops the theoretical model we use to frame our empirical analysis. Our
starting point is the heterogeneous private values auction model of Maskin and Riley (2000),
which we slightly extend to incorporate participation decisions and possible collusion in open
auctions. We discuss some speci￿c modeling choices at the end of the section.
A. The Model
We consider an auction for a single tract of timber. Prior to the sale, the seller announces
a reserve price r and the auction format: open ascending or ￿rst price sealed bid. There is a set
N of potential risk-neutral bidders. Each bidder must incur a cost K to gather information
and enter the auction. By paying K, bidder i learns his (private) value for the tract, vi, and
may bid in the auction. We refer to bidders who acquire information as participants, and
denote the set of participants by n.
We assume each bidder i￿ s value is an independent draw from a distribution Fi with
continuous density fi and support [v = r;vi]. Anticipating our empirical analysis, we allow
for two kinds of bidders. Bidders 1;:::;NL are Loggers and have value distribution FL,
while bidders NL + 1;:::;NL + NM are Mills and have value distribution FM. We assume
that FM stochastically dominates FL according to a hazard rate order, so that for all v,
4fM(v)=FM(v) ￿ fL(v)=FL(v). We sometimes refer to the mills as strong bidders and the
loggers as weak bidders.
We adopt a standard model of the bidding process. In an open auction, the price rises
from the reserve price and the auction terminates when all but one participating bidder
has dropped out. With sealed bidding, participating bidders independently submit bids;
the highest bidder wins and pays his bid. For both auctions, we assume that bidders make
independent decisions to acquire information, but learn the identities of other participants
before submitting their bids.
A strategy for bidder i consists of a bidding strategy and an entry strategy. A bidding
strategy bi(￿;n) speci￿es i￿ s bid (or drop-out point in the case of an open auction) as a
function of his value and the set of participating bidders. An entry strategy pi speci￿es a
probability of entering the auction.
A type-symmetric entry equilibrium is a pair of bidding strategies bL(￿;n);bM(￿;n) and
entry strategies pL;pM with the property that: (i) loggers use the strategy bL;pL and mills the
strategy bM;pM; (ii) each bidder￿ s bid strategy maximizes his pro￿ts conditional on entering;
and (iii) each bidder enters if and only if his expected pro￿t from entry exceeds the entry
cost (and may enter probabilistically if the two are equal). To characterize type-symmetric
equilibria, we ￿rst consider the bidding game and then the entry game.
B. Equilibrium Bidding
We begin with the sealed bid auction. Suppose i is a participating bidder with value vi,
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The ￿rst order conditions, together with the boundary condition that bi(r;n) = r for all i,
uniquely characterize optimal bidding strategies for any set of participants n, and provide a
basis for estimating bidders￿value distributions (Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong, 2000).
Equilibrium bidding behavior exhibits several key features. First, bid strategies are type-
5symmetric. Second, mills submit higher bids: GM(b;n) ￿ GL(b;n) for all b. This is a testable
implication of the model. Third, mills shade their bids more than loggers: bM(v;n) ￿ bL(v;n)
for all v. This implies that a logger may win despite not having the highest value.
Now consider the open auction. In this case, all participants have a dominant strategy
of bidding up to their valuation, so bi(v;n) = v. Bidder i￿ s expected pro￿t conditional on









Unlike the sealed bid auction, the open auction is e¢ cient: the entrant with the highest value
wins the auction.
C. Equilibrium Entry
We now characterize equilibrium entry. Let ￿￿
L(nL;nM) and ￿￿
M(nL;nM) denote the
expected logger and mill pro￿t in auction format ￿ 2 fo;sg if the set of participants n
includes nL loggers and nM mills, and participants use equilibrium bid strategies. Then








i(nL;nM)Pr[nL;nM j i enters, opponents play p￿i], (4)




ing on whether i is a logger or mill. Entering is optimal if the expected pro￿t ￿￿
i(p) exceeds
the entry cost K.
A type-symmetric entry equilibrium (pL;pM) exists for both auction formats, but in
general it need not be unique. The following result is useful in this regard.
Proposition 1 Suppose that for all nL;nM, ￿s
M(nL;nM + 1) > ￿s
L(nL;nM). Then there is
a unique type-symmetric entry equilibrium for both auction formats. In equilibrium, either
pL = 0 or pM = 1.
The uniqueness condition requires that mills have a su¢ cient value advantage over loggers
to outweigh the e⁄ects of facing an additional bidder. As a matter of theory it is rather strong.
In our empirical work, however, we estimate bidder value distributions without making any
equilibrium assumptions about entry behavior, and then verify that the condition holds for
each sale tract in our data. Thus the calibrated version of our model always has a unique
6type-symmetric entry equilibrium. In our data, we observe logger entry in more than 85% of
sales and always more potential logger entrants than actual logger entrants, so the empirically
relevant equilibrium appears to be one in which each logger enters with probability between
zero and one.2
D. Comparing Auction Formats
We now compare the equilibrium outcomes of open and sealed bid auctions. A useful
benchmark to have in mind is the case where bidders are homogeneous, so FL = FM. In this
case, we have auction equivalence as follows: If bidders are homogenous, so FL = FM, the
sealed bid and open auction each have a unique symmetric entry equilibrium, in which the
highest valued entrant wins the auction. These equilibria have (i) the same expected entry,
(ii) the same allocation; and (iii) the same expected revenue.
This equivalence breaks down with heterogeneous bidders. Because mills shade their bids
more than loggers in the sealed bid equilibrium, a logger has a greater chance to win, and
hence has greater expected pro￿ts, than in an open auction where the allocation is e¢ cient.
The argument is reversed for mills, leading to the following result.
Proposition 2 For any type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the sealed bid auction, there is
a type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the open auction in which: (i) loggers are less likely
to enter; (ii) mills are more likely to enter; (iii) it is less likely a logger will win.
The statement of the result is complicated by the possibility of multiple equilibria. Under
the uniqueness condition of Proposition 1, however, the prediction is unambiguous: open
bidding leads to less logger entry, equivalent mill entry and a lower chance that a logger
wins.3
There is no general theoretical comparison of expected revenue, even with ￿xed partici-
pation. This provides further motivation for the parameterized model we develop in Section
5. The model does imply that sealed bidding is less e¢ cient. The sealed bid auction is inef-
￿cient even conditional on participation, while the socially e¢ cient type-symmetric outcome
is achieved as an equilibrium of the open auction (Athey, Levin and Seira, 2004).
2The condition in Proposition 1 also greatly restricts the set of non-type-symmetric equilibria as it
implies that in any equilibrium where any logger enters with positive probability, every mill must enter
with probability one. If for example, we were to restrict attention to pure strategy entry equilibrium, every
equilibrium would involve some number nM of entering mills and nL of entering loggers, where nL > 0 would
imply nM = NM.
3The idea that sealed bidding may increase entry by weaker bidders is emphasized by Klemperer (2004)
in the context of spectrum auctions.
7E. Collusion in Open Auctions
As noted in the Introduction, we estimate that in some forests open auction prices are
substantially lower than sealed bid prices. This ￿nding, and the fact that collusion in open
auctions has been a long-standing concern in Forest Service sales (Mead, 1966; U.S. Congress,
1976; Froeb and McAfee, 1988; Baldwin et al, 1997), suggests incorporating open auction
collusion into the model.
Collusive schemes can take many forms, so we assume for concreteness that participating
mills at an open auction cooperate perfectly. The participating mill with the highest value
bids his value, while the other mills register as participants but do not actively bid. Loggers
simply bid up to their value. We maintain the assumption that bidders make independent
participation decisions, so mills anticipate cooperating with other participating mills, but do
not coordinate entry.4
Fixing the set of participants, collusion clearly will lower prices and increase mill pro￿ts.
But it has no e⁄ect on who wins the auction or on logger pro￿ts, because only the high-
valued mill is relevant in this regard. Nevertheless, collusion gives mills a greater incentive
to participate, and this may crowd out logger participation.
Proposition 3 For any type-symmetric entry equilibrium of the open auction, there is a
type-symmetric collusive equilibrium in which: (i) Loggers are less likely to enter; (ii) Mills
are more likely to enter; (iii) It is less likely a logger will win. Thus, for any type-symmetric
entry equilibrium of the sealed bid auction, there is a type-symmetric collusive equilibrium of
the open auction where (i)-(iii) hold.
For the empirically relevant case in which there is a unique type-symmetric equilibrium
where mills enter with probability one and loggers randomize, collusion has no e⁄ect on
entry or allocation relative to the competitive open auction outcome. It simply lowers prices.
Therefore to the extent that the competitive model might explain observed departures from
revenue equivalence in terms of entry and allocation, the possibility of collusion provides
further ￿ exibility in terms of explaining price di⁄erences across auction formats.
F. Discussion of Modeling Choices
Our model omits at least two forces of potential importance: common values and bidder
risk-aversion. In timber auctions, di⁄erences in bidder costs and contractual arrangements
4There are forms of collusion, such as bid rotation, that involve coordinated entry. We have looked for
evidence of this in our data by checking whether the entry of pairs of mills or loggers is negatively correlated
conditional on sale characteristics. There are a handful of pairs for which entry is signi￿cantly negatively
correlated, but for the vast majority of pairs negative correlation can be rejected.
8provide a source of private value di⁄erences. At the same time, bidders can obtain private
estimates of the quality and quantity of timber and may have di⁄ering beliefs about future
market conditions. This suggests a potential ￿common value￿component as well (Athey
and Levin, 2001; Haile, Hong and Shum, 2003).5 It is also plausible that bidders at Forest
Service timber auctions exhibit a degree of risk-aversion. Indeed Athey and Levin (2001)
provide some indirect support for this based on the way observed bids are constructed (see
also Perrigne, 2003).
While a model that allows for common values and bidder risk-aversion might have addi-
tional realism, we decided to abstract away from them for two reasons. First, as we discuss
below, our empirical results indicate departures from revenue equivalence that are qualita-
tively di⁄erent from those implied by common values or risk-aversion. Second, incorporating
either signi￿cantly complicates the analysis. Hence we opted to use a simpler model we felt
might still explain the data.
3. Timber Sales
We now describe the key institutional features of timber auctions, our data, and the
process through which the Forest Service decides when to use open or sealed bidding.
A. The Timber Sale Process
Our data consists of timber sales held between 1982 and 1990 in Kootenai and Idaho
Panhandle National Forests, neighboring forests on the Idaho/Montana border. These are
the two forests in the Forest Service￿ s Northern region with the largest timber sale programs.
They make a good test case for comparing auction formats because they use a mix of open and
sealed auctions and the tracts sold under the two formats appear to be relatively homogenous.
We discuss the way auction format is determined in more detail below. We also provide
evidence from sales held in California between 1982 and 1989. These forests also use both
open and sealed bidding, but the auction format varies more systematically with the size of
the sale, which makes controlling for tract di⁄erences more challenging.
In both regions, a sale begins with the Forest Service identifying a tract of timber to be
o⁄ered and organizing a ￿cruise￿to estimate the merchantable timber. The sale is announced
5Athey and Levin (2001) show that in certain Forest Service auctions, bidders can pro￿t from acquiring
commonly relevant information about timber volumes. They also show, however, that the potential rents
are competed away, suggesting that the equilibrium information asymmetry about volumes may not be
quantitatively large. Haile (2001) analyzes how resale markets can lead to common values even if the
underlying environment is one of private values.
9publicly at least thirty days prior to the auction. The announcement includes the form of the
auction, estimates of available timber and logging costs, tract characteristics and a reserve
price. The reserve price is computed according to a formula that uses the cruise estimates
of timber value and costs, and adds a ￿xed margin for pro￿t and risk. In some cases, the
Forest Service restricts entry to ￿rms with less than 500, or less than 25, employees. We do
not consider these small business sales.
Before the auction, the bidders have the opportunity to cruise the tract and prepare bids.
For sealed bid sales, the Forest Service records the identity of each bidder and their bid. For
open auctions, ￿rms must submit a qualifying bid prior to the sale. Typically these bids are
set to equal the reserve price. The Forest Service records the identity of each qualifying ￿rm,
as well as the highest bid each quali￿er o⁄ers during the auction. A useful consequence is
that we observe all open auction bidders, even those who do not bid actively, which allows
a comparison of entry patterns across auctions.
Once the auction is completed, the winner has a set amount of time ￿typically one to
four years in our sample ￿ to harvest the timber. Some of the sales in our sample are ￿scale
sales￿meaning the winner pays for the timber only after it is removed from the tract. The
fact that payments are based on harvested timber, but bids are computed based on quantity
estimates means there can be a gap between the winning bid and the ultimate revenue.
Athey and Levin (2001) study the incentive this creates for strategic bidder behavior. For
the scale sales in our sample, we have limited harvest data, so we use the bid price as a
proxy for revenue. The remaining sales are ￿lump-sum￿sales. In these sales the winner of
the auction pays the bid price directly.
B. Data Description
For each sale in our sample, we know the identity and bid of each participating bidder, as
well as detailed sale characteristics from the Forest Service sale announcement. The bidders
in these auctions range from large vertically integrated forest products conglomerates to
individually-owned logging companies. To study participation and allocation in a way that
respects this variation, we classify bidders into two groups: ￿mills￿that have manufacturing
capacity and ￿loggers￿that do not. One can imagine other possible ways to try to capture
the diversity of bidders. In practice, however, other natural groupings, such as by number
of employees or by number of auctions entered, turn out to be quite similar.
Our theoretical model assumes that mills tend to have higher willingness to pay than
loggers. An implication is that mills should submit higher bids and win disproportionately.
To check this, we regress the per-unit bids (in logs) from the sealed bid auctions on a
10dummy for whether the bidder is a mill and auction ￿xed e⁄ects. For the Northern forests,
we estimate a mill dummy coe¢ cient of 0.248, meaning mill bids are 25% higher on average,
with a t-statistic of roughly 8. An entering mill is also more likely to win than an entering
logger (28% versus 21%). The pattern in California is similar though the magnitudes are
smaller. Controlling for auction ￿xed e⁄ects, mill bids are just over 12% higher on average.
Mills are also more likely to win conditional on participating in an auction.
The model of entry requires that we have a measure of potential bidders for each sale.
As we discuss below, so long as loggers enter with positive probability (the relevant case
for our data), our calibrated model implies that in any equilibrium all mills must enter.
Therefore under the assumption that ￿rms use equilibrium entry strategies, we can infer
that the number of potential mill entrants for a given sale is just the number of actual mill
entrants. To construct a measure of potential logger entrants for a given sale, we count the
number of distinct logging companies that entered an auction in the same geographic area
in the prior year.6 We also do a similar count for mills and use it as a control in our baseline
regressions, where we do not impose any assumption of equilibrium behavior.
Table 1 presents summary statistics of sale characteristics and auction outcomes. Focus-
ing on the full sample, there are some obvious di⁄erences between the open and sealed bid
auctions. In the Northern forests, the average sale price per unit of timber (in 1982 dollars
per thousand board feet of timber or $/mbf) is roughly $62 in the sealed auctions and $69
in the open auctions. The number of entering logging companies is also somewhat higher
in sealed auctions (3.2 versus 2.5), while the number of entering mills is slightly lower (1.2
versus 1.5). Contracts sold by sealed auction are more likely to be won by a logging company
than tracts sold by open auction.
These numbers are broadly consistent with the model presented above. At the same time,
the table indicates that the tracts sold by open auction are not identical to those sold by
sealed bid. While the per-unit reserve price of the timber is similar across format, the open
auction tracts tend to be larger. Sale di⁄erences, particularly in terms of size are even more
pronounced in California. This suggests that we need to understand how the sale format is
decided and control for tract characteristics to isolate the e⁄ects of auction format.
C. Choice of Sale Method
6This measure probably su⁄ers from a degree of measurement error. Firms may go in and out of business
or become more or less active in Forest Service auctions over time without our knowledge. Moreover, the
Forest Service data records bidder names with a variety of spellings and abbreviations. Despite carefully
checking each name and cross-referencing with industry reference books, we may not have obtained perfectly
accurate counts. Note that for the large Northern forests, we use forest-district as the relevant geographic
area; for Califoria we use forest.
11The U.S. Forest Service has historically used both open and sealed bid auctions to sell
timber from the national forests. The policy in place at the time of our data arose from a
debate that followed passage of federal legislation in 1976. At that time, Congress proposed
the use of sealed bidding. The implementation of the law, however, allowed individual forest
managers to use open auctions if they could justify the choice. As a result, sale method has
varied geographically. In the Paci￿c Northwest, for instance, open auctions predominate.
We focus on areas that have used a more balanced mix of open and sealed bidding.
One reason for focusing on the two Northern forests is that Schuster and Niccolucci (1993)
report that the choice of sale format was explicitly randomized for a subset of these sales.
In one forest district the format apparently was determined by picking colored marbles out
of a bag. Unfortunately, we do not know precisely how the randomization procedure varied
across forest districts and over time. We have replicated our analysis using the subsample
that Schuster and Niccolucci (1993) identify as randomized, and get similar results to what
we report below, though our estimates lose precision due to the smaller sample size.7
To better understand the determinants of sale method in our sample, we consider a logit
regression where the dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the auction is sealed bid
and equal to 0 if the sale is an open auction. We include a large set of observable tract
characteristics, including the reserve price and the Forest Service estimates of the volume of
timber, its eventual selling value, and the costs of logging, manufacturing and road-building.
We also include the density of timber on the tract, the contract length, whether the sale
is a salvage sale, and a Her￿ndal index of the concentration of species on the tract. To
capture market conditions, we include the number of U.S. housing starts in the previous
month, the U.S. Census count of the number of logging ￿rms and sawmills in the county of
the sale, and our measure of potential bidders. In addition, we include dummy variables for
the year of the sale, the quarter of the sale, the area in which the sale took place (forest
district in the Northern region and forest in California), and if major species were present.
We are particularly sensitive to the importance of sale size, so rather than simply assuming
a linear or quadratic e⁄ect, we specify its e⁄ect as a step function with 10 steps that roughly
correspond to deciles in the data.
7Relative to Schuster and Nicolluci, we use more districts and years within the two largest Northern
Region forests (they focus on 1987-1990). In including these additional years, our motivation is that the set
of tracts sold by open and sealed bidding appear to vary mainly with size, time and location, precisely the
characteristics we need to control for in any case with the randomized sales. Schuster and Nicolluci, however,
include some sales from other forests. We focus on the two largest forests because timber markets in Idaho
and Montana are quite local due to the geography, while tract characteristics also vary with geography as
well, making it di¢ cult to e⁄ectively control for heterogeneity in forests with fewer sales.
12The results are reported in Table 2. As expected, sale size is a signi￿cant correlate of
auction method, particularly in California. Even after controlling for time and geographic
location, smaller sales tend to be sealed bid, while larger sales tend to be open auctions.
Moreover, di⁄erent forests and forest districts use somewhat di⁄erent sale methods on aver-
age.
Because sale method varies with observable sale characteristics, we want to control for
these characteristics in comparing the outcomes of the open and sealed bid auctions. A
concern is that, even controlling for tract characteristics ￿ exibly, some open sales in our
data may look very ￿unlike￿any sealed bid sales and conversely some sealed sales may look
unlike any open sales. This will be re￿ ected in having some sales for which the predicted
probability of being sealed according to our logit regression, i.e. the propensity score, will
be close to zero or one. This occurs for many of the open auctions in California, mainly
because in that region very large sales are almost certain not to be sealed bid.
In order to compare relatively similar tracts in our empirical analysis, we drop sales that
have a propensity score below 0.075 or above 0.925. This results in dropping 154 open
auctions and 8 sealed auctions in the Northern Forests. It has a much more dramatic e⁄ect
in California, where we retain only one-third of the sales. The result, however, is that the
selected sample has much smaller di⁄erences in sale characteristics across sale format.
4. Comparing Auctions: Evidence
In this section, we investigate the consequences of auction choice for bidder participation,
revenue and allocation. Our empirical approach is fairly straightforward; we describe it now
before turning to the speci￿c questions.
A. Empirical Approach
For a given outcome Y (such as the number of entering mills or loggers, or the auction
price per unit), suppose that
Y = f(SEALED;X;N;"); (5)
where SEALED is a dummy equal to one if the auction is sealed and zero if the auction
is open, X is a vector of observed sale characteristics, N represents measures of potential
competition, and " is unobservable. We are interested in the average e⁄ect of auction format,
denoted ￿Y = EX;N;"[f(1;X;N;") ￿ f(0;X;N;")].
13The crucial identifying assumption auction format is independent of the unobserved com-
ponent " conditional on covariates. This clearly holds for sales where auction method was
randomly designated, although it is important that X included the administrative unit doing
the randomization, given that assignment probabilities di⁄ered by forest district. It holds
for the other sales if the choice of format is based on information from the Forest Service
appraisal, or follows some rule based on covariates in our data.8
We consider three alternative estimates of the ￿average treatment e⁄ects￿￿Y. The ￿rst
is an ordinary least squares regression:
Y = ￿ ￿ SEALED + X￿ + N￿ + "; (6)
which is easily interpretable but doesn￿ t allow the e⁄ect of sealed bidding to vary across
tracts. The second speci￿cation allows for this variation by interacting SEALED with
the individual covariates. We then compute and report an average e⁄ect for the sample.
The third approach is a matching estimator that matches every sealed bid auction with the
M ￿closest￿open auctions and vice versa. Closeness is measured by distance between the
estimated propensity scores of the auctions in the sample.9 The average e⁄ect of auction
format is calculated by comparing the outcome of each sale t, Yt, with the average outcome











(^ Yt ￿ Yt):
Here T is the number of sales. We implement this estimator, setting M = 4, and compute
robust standard errors following Abadie and Imbens (2006). The three alternative approaches
yield very similar empirical results, providing assurance that our ￿ndings are not driven by
8If the forest manager uses a deterministic rule, for instance using open auction whenever the volume
of timber exceeds a threshold (which seems a possible description of some areas in California), then in
principle auction format will not vary conditional on X. In practice, if our speci￿cation of X does not
exactly match the rule, we will estimate Pr(SEALEDjX) to be intermediate for sales close to the cut-o⁄.
So long as unobserved sale chacteristics are independent of the assignment conditional on X, we will still be
identi￿ed in a manner analogous to a ￿regression discontinuity￿approach, whereby discontinuous changes
in the outcomes in response to changes in x close to the threshold will be attributed to auction format.
9We also experimented with using larger numbers of sale characteristics in constructing matches, and
with adjusting for bias as suggested by Abadie and Imbens. To do this we de￿ne the distance between sales
with covariates x and z as jjx ￿ zjjW, where jjxjjW = (x0Wx)1=2 and W is a diagonal matrix consisting of
the inverses of the variances of the covariates x. There is some sensitivity to the exact choice of matching
covariates and use of bias correction, and alternative matching strategies arguably suggest larger e⁄ects of
sealed bidding than our reported estimates. We report the propensity score match estimates as they are
conservative and in line with the regression estimates.
14a particular speci￿cation or functional form assumption.
B. Evidence from the Northern and California Forests
We report our empirical results on the e⁄ect of auction choice in Table 3. Each column
displays the estimated e⁄ect of sealed bidding on a sale outcome conditional on sale charac-
teristics, with the relevant outcomes being logger entry, mill entry, bidder composition and
sale revenue.
We ￿nd that sealed bidding has a strongly positive e⁄ect on logger entry in both the
Northern and California forests. In particular, we estimate that sealed bid auctions attract
around 10% more logger entrants in both the Northern and California forests. This translates
into roughly 2-3 additional entrants for every 10 sales. All six point estimates are statistically
signi￿cant; the estimates are somewhat more precise in the Northern forests where the
sample is larger. In contrast, sale format appears to have little e⁄ect on entry by mills.
All speci￿cations for the Northern forests, and the regression speci￿cations for California
yield small and statistically insigni￿cant e⁄ects. The one exception is the matching estimate
for California, which suggests lower mill participation in the sealed bid auctions.10
The consequence of increased logger participation and unchanged or decreased mill par-
ticipation is that the composition of bidders in sealed bid auctions is shifted toward loggers.
We estimate that the fraction of participants who are loggers 5-6% higher in sealed bid
auctions in both the Northern and California forests. The composition e⁄ect suggests that
sealed bid auctions will be more likely to be won by loggers. Our ￿ndings are consistent
with this as well. We estimate a 3-4% greater chance that a logger will win if the auction is
sealed bid. These last point estimates are not highly precise, particularly in California, so
we cannot rule out a fairly small e⁄ect of auction format on allocation.
The ￿nal columns of Table 3 report our estimates of the e⁄ect of auction format on
the sale price per unit volume. Here our ￿ndings di⁄er dramatically across the two areas.
In California, we ￿nd little di⁄erence in sale price between the two auction formats. Our
estimates indicate slightly higher revenue in the sealed bid auctions, but the ￿nding is not
statistically signi￿cant and reverses after controlling for the number of entering loggers and
mills. In the Northern forests, however, we ￿nd that sealed bid prices are around 10% higher
than open auction prices after controlling for sale characteristics. Our point estimates are
highly signi￿cant. To get a sense of the magnitude of this e⁄ect in dollar terms, note that the
10Although we will not develop the point, we note that reduced mill participation in sealed bid auctions
would be consistent with a version of the theoretical model where entry costs are heterogeneous (Athey,
Levin and Seira, 2004).
15average winning bid (in 1982 dollars rather than 1982 dollars per unit volume) is just over
$134;000. So a 10% di⁄erence in the winning bid price translates into a $13;000 di⁄erence
in Forest Service revenue per sale, or about $14 million for the whole sample.
A natural question is whether the revenue di⁄erence is due to sealed bid auctions at-
tracting more bidders. The ￿nal column reports estimates of the sale price that include
the number of entering loggers and mills as covariates. Even controlling for the number of
entrants, sale method appears to matter. In the regression estimates, sealed bid auctions
generate roughly 6% (s.e. 3%) more revenue. The matching estimate is a bit higher at 9%.
The table does not report the revenue decomposition, but the estimates suggest that an ad-
ditional mill is associated with about a 19% increase in the winning bid, while an additional
logger is associated with about a 12% increase in the winning bid.11
C. Explaining the Departures from Revenue Equivalence
At a qualitative level, the theoretical model developed earlier is consistent with all of
the empirical ￿ndings just reported: greater logger participation in sealed bid auctions,
a negligible change in mill participation, a higher probability in sealed bid sales that a
logging company will win, and either a small di⁄erence in prices across auction formats or
substantially higher prices in the sealed bid sales. Moreover, the key assumptions generating
these departures from revenue equivalence: that bidders are heterogeneous, that mills are
stronger bidders than logging companies and that entry should be treated as endogenous,
also seem consistent with the data.
What we cannot say at this point, however, is whether a reasonable parametrization of
the model can match our quantitative ￿ndings. Moreover, recall that the theory predicts
qualitatively the same di⁄erences between open and sealed bidding regardless of whether the
mills are able to collude in open auctions, a primary concern that has historically motivated
the use of sealed bidding in Forest Service timber auctions. Without a more quantitative
approach to the model, we cannot distinguish between its competitive and collusive versions.
With this motivation, we turn in the next section to estimating the model￿ s parameters and
comparing the quantitative predictions of the theories to the data.
Before doing this, however, we pause to consider whether there might be alternative
11A natural concern in interpreting this revenue decomposition arises if there are sale characteristics that
are observed by the bidders prior to making their entry decision but not accounted for in our data. In
this event, the number of entrants is endogenous in this regression. To explore this, we experimented with
using our measures of potential competition as an instrument for the number of entering bidders. We found,
however, that our estimated coe¢ cients were highly sensitive to the particular choice of potential competition
measures, none of which are ideal.
16explanations for our empirical ￿ndings that are distinct from the forces captured in our
theoretical model. One possibility is that our estimates do not re￿ ect the systematic e⁄ects
of auction format at all, but rather a confounding correlation between auction choice and
unobserved aspects of the sale that also a⁄ect the outcome. This is certainly a concern.
Even in the Northern forests, where many sale assignments were random, we may not have
perfectly controlled for sale di⁄erences. And as we have noted the di⁄erences are greater
in California. We have attempted to mitigate this by making use of the very rich data on
sale characteristics in the Forest Service sale reports, augmented by further data on market
conditions.
Could it be the case that some omitted variable is generating our ￿ndings? Several of the
most obvious stories have problems themselves. For instance, one possibility is that forest
managers like to sell more valuable tracts by sealed bid, a bias that would help to explain
the entry and revenue di⁄erences we ￿nd. This story is hard to square, however, with the
fact that larger sales, which are by de￿nition more valuable on a total value basis, are more
often sold by open auction. A second possibility is that forest managers use sealed bid sales
when they expect more bidder interest, especially on the part of logging companies. This
would help to explain the entry results, but contradicts both perceptions within the industry
and the Forest Service￿ s own guidelines. Industry lore suggests a scenario where the mills
prefer oral auctions (as predicted by our theory), and where forest managers defer to the
mill￿ s preferences. And the Forest Service instructs managers to use sealed bidding if they
expect a sale not to be competitive (Forest Service Handbook 2409.18, Chapter 57.1).
Another possibility is that our ￿nding do re￿ ect systematic departures from auction equiv-
alence, but not for the reasons captured in our model. For instance, our model abstracted
from two potentially relevant aspects of timber auctions: common values and bidder risk-
aversion. Could either of these explain our empirical ￿ndings? While our results certainly do
not rule out their presence, neither seem likely to be the primary source of the departures we
observe from revenue equivalence. Theoretical models with common or a¢ liated values (and
without the other elements of our model, namely bidder heterogeneity and collusion), imply
lower prices in sealed auctions rather than higher as we observe in the data. Bidder risk-
aversion potentially could explain the observed prices, But at least in the cases considered
by Matthews (1987), risk aversion would lead to lower participation in sealed bid auctions
contrary to our ￿ndings. So to the extent that either common values or bidder risk-aversion
would help to explain the data, they would have to be part of a more complicated story.
5. Structural Estimation and Testing
17In this section we bring the model and the data together to assess the relationship be-
tween our empirical ￿ndings and the theory we proposed to account for them. We investigate
three related issues. First, we ask whether a calibrated version of our model, with parame-
ters estimated from the data, can quantitatively match the departures we observe from
revenue equivalence. Second, we ask whether the model can provide a measure of bidder
competitiveness in the open auctions. Finally, we estimate the welfare consequences of mov-
ing exclusively to open or sealed bidding, under the assumption that our estimated model
accurately describes the sale environment.
The key elements of our approach are as follows. We use entry and bidding data from the
sealed bid auctions to estimate the parameters of our theoretical model ￿ the value distrib-
utions of loggers and mills, and the costs of entry ￿ as functions of the tract characteristics.
To do this, we assume competitive behavior in the sealed bid auctions as outlined above.
We allow for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in the underlying values of the
tracts. We then use the calibrated model to predict the equilibrium outcome of each sale in
our sample and compare the predictions to the actual outcomes. For tracts sold by sealed
bidding, this provides a measure of how well our model ￿ts the data. For tracts sold by open
auction, the predictions are out-of-sample because the open auction tracts were not used to
estimate the parameters of the model and because the open auction is a di⁄erent game than
the sealed bid auction around which estimation is based.12 Comparing the predictions to
outcomes allows us to assess whether the model accurately accounts for the observed di⁄er-
ences across auction formats. It also provides a way to evaluate the competitiveness of open
auctions. Finally, we develop a welfare comparison of open and sealed bidding.
A. Structural Estimation
Our ￿rst step is to use the sealed bid data to estimate the parameters of the theoretical
model as a function of tract characteristics. To estimate the value distributions of mills and
loggers, we build on the approach pioneered by Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2000). They
suggest ￿tting a distribution to the observed sealed bids, then using the ￿rst-order condition
for optimal bidding to recover the bidders￿value distributions. Given the value distributions,
we can estimate entry costs using observed entry behavior.
A notable feature of our data is that bids within a given sealed bid auction are highly
correlated conditional on observed sale characteristics. We therefore follow Krasnokutskaya
12In principle one might try to use the data from the open auctions to help estimation the model. Athey
and Haile (2002), however, show that when values are correlated as in our model of unobserved heterogeneity,
underlying value distributions cannot be identi￿ed from open auction bids. Haile and Tamer (2003) point
out additional concerns with drawing inferences from losing bids in open auctions.
18(2004) in allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in sale characteristics. An extension along
these lines appears crucial as, in line with Krasnokutskaya￿ s work on highway procurement,
we estimate implausibly high bid margins when we fail to account for within-auction bid
correlation.13
Formally, let X denote the set of sale characteristics known both to the econometrician
and the bidders. Let u denote an auction characteristic known to participating bidders
but not observed in our data. Let N = (NL;NM) represent the number of potential mill
and logger entrants. And let n = (nL;nM) denote the numbers of participating mills and
loggers. We assume that bidders initially have the information in the sale announcement
and knowledge of the set of potential bidders; that is, they know (X;N). They then decide
whether to incur the entry cost, K(X;N), and participate in the auction. If they participate,
they learn the set of participating bidders n, the sale characteristic u and their private value.
We write bidder value distributions as FL(￿jX;u;N) and FM(￿jX;u;N), and assume that
values are independent conditional on (X;u;N).
Given these assumptions, we can write the equilibrium bid distributions as GL(￿jX;u;N;n)
and GM(￿jX;u;N;n). We assume that if there is a single bidder he optimally bids the reserve
price, but otherwise we treat the reserve price as non-binding.14 More generally, we assume
the data we observe is generated by a type-symmetric entry equilibrium. As we discuss be-
low, there is a unique such equilibrium consistent with the estimated value distributions and
observed entry probabilities. In this equilibrium, mills enter with certainty and each logger
enters with some probability between zero and one depending on sale characteristics. This
means that we can infer the number of potential mill entrants NM as equal to the number of
participating mills nM. For each sale, we use our count of active logging companies described
earlier as our measure of potential logging entrants, NL . Finally, we maintain the standard
assumption that auctions in our sample are independent of one another.
Estimating the Bid Distributions
Conditional on the observable sale characteristics (X;N) and set of participants n, the
13An alternative way to rationalize correlation in bids is with an a¢ liated private values model, but at
least in the baseline symmetric model a¢ liation implies that prices will be higher in open auctions, contrary
to our data. As an institutional matter, we also believe it plausible that bidders commonly observe certain
features of a tract that make it more or less valuable.
14See Haile (2001) for a discussion of why Forest Service reserve prices are typically non-binding. A slight
drawback to this assumption is that our ￿tted bid distributions will assign positive (though typically small)
probability to bids below the reserve price. We did experiment with modeling bidder values (and hence bids)
as being distributed above the reserve price, but found that this model ￿t the data poorly, possibly because
the mechanical formula used to determine the reserve price may not track changes in bidder values over time
or across auctions well.
19joint distribution of bids in a given auction is a combination of three distributions: the bid
distributions GL(￿jX;u;N;n) and GM(￿jX;u;N;n) and the distribution of the unobserved
auction heterogeneity u, which is responsible for any correlation of the bids. We adopt a
parametric approach to estimate these three distributions.
Our particular model speci￿es Weibull bid distributions with Gamma distributed auction
heterogeneity. Thus we assume that for k = L;M:








Here ￿k(￿) is the scale, and ￿k(￿) the shape, of the Weibull distribution, parametrized as
ln￿k(X;N;n) = X￿X + N￿N + n￿n;k + ￿0;k and ln￿k(n) = n￿n;k + ￿0;k.15;16 We assume
u has a Gamma distribution with unit mean and variance ￿, and is independent of X; N;
and n. We estimate these parameters of the model, (￿;￿;￿), by maximum likelihood; the
likelihood function is written out in the Appendix. The estimates are reported in Table 4.
Several points about the estimated bid distributions deserve mention. First, recall that
the basic assumption of the theory was that mill values stochastically dominate logger values,
and an implication was that mill bids should dominate logger bids. Our empirical speci￿ca-
tion does not impose this. Nonetheless, we ￿nd that mill bids do dominate those of loggers.
On average, mill bids are roughly 25% higher than logger bids in the Northern forests and
15% higher in California. Also consistent with the theoretical model, we ￿nd that bids
are increasing in the number of competitors (a property that can potentially be violated if
bidder values are a¢ liated or have a common value component). Finally, we estimate for
both geographical regions that u has signi￿cant variance, con￿rming that our modeling of
unobserved heterogeneity across auctions is warranted.
Importantly, the Gamma-Weibull functional form appears to provide a good ￿t to the
observed distribution of logger and mill bids, the within-auction bid correlation, and the
observed sealed bid prices. Our model has the useful property bidder i￿ s bid in auction t
15The speci￿cation we adopt is more parsimonious than in our earlier regressions. Our results do not
seem sensitive to including additional covariates; nevertheless, we opted for parsimony because of the need
to make out-of-sample predictions where over-￿tting could in principle be a problem.
16Specifying how the number of participants should a⁄ect the bid distribution is a challenge in two-stage
structural estimation of auction models, because there is no easy way to incorporate the theoretical restriction
that the value distributions be independent of the number of bidders. Theory does predict that mill behavior
could be quite di⁄erent if there is only a single mill, which motivates us to include a single mill e⁄ect in
the mill bid distribution. Theory also predicts that the e⁄ect of an additional bidder on a given bidder￿ s
behavior should be limited as the number of bidders grows. For this reason, use minfnL;ng and minfnM;ng
in place of nL;nM in our estimates, where n = 5:
20can be expressed as bit = exp(Xt￿X + Nt￿N) ￿ "it(n). De￿ning the sealed bid residuals as
^ "it = bit=exp(Xt^ ￿X+Nt^ ￿N), we investigate how closely these residuals match the distribution
of the "it￿ s predicted by our ￿tted model. In the Northern forests, the overall mean of the
bid residuals is 2.16; the standard deviation is 1.18; the between-auction standard deviation
is 0.94 and the within-auction standard deviation is 0.75. By way of comparison, the ￿tted
model predicts a mean of 2.12, and respective standard deviations of 1.21, 0.97 and 0.70.
We obtain a similarly close ￿t in the California forests, where the respective numbers from
the data are 25.9, 12.6, 9.7 and 8.5 compared to our model￿ s prediction of 25.6, 13.6, 10.8
and 8.1. To provide a visual picture, Figure 1 plots the distribution of sealed bid residuals
in our sample (i.e. the distribution of the ^ "its, where) next to the distribution predicted by
our ￿tted model.
Despite this informal con￿rmation of model ￿t, one might still wonder whether our para-
metric modeling is unduly restrictive.17 To address the issue more formally, we implement
a natural speci￿cation test due to Andrews (1997). Andrews￿Conditional Kolmogorov Test
tests the null hypothesis that conditional on a set of exogenous covariates, a set of endoge-
nous variables is generated by a particular parametric distribution. In our case the exogenous
covariates are the sale characteristics (X;N), the endogenous variables are the bids, and the
parametric model is the Gamma-Weibull mixture model. Andrews￿test is based on a boot-
strap procedure in which one uses the estimated model to repeatedly draw samples of the
endogenous variables and compares these simulated datasets to the observed data. We im-
plement the test and ￿nd that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that our parametric
speci￿cation is correct, even at very high con￿dence levels (20% in both the Northern forests
and California). These ￿ndings provide additional support for our modeling approach.
Estimating the Value Distributions
We now turn to recovering the bidders￿value distributions. Under the assumption that
the observed bids are consistent with equilibrium behavior, each bid must be optimal against
the opponents￿bid distributions. That is, a bidder￿ s value vi is related to his observed bid
17For instance, Krasnokutskaya (2004) estimates a semi-parametric model with unobserved heterogeneity
assuming that the unobserved component of the bid separates multiplicatively into an auction e⁄ect and an
idiosyncratic component. In our setting, an important practical problem with semi-parametric estimation is
that one would want to estimate the model separately for each vector of participants (nL;nM) and we simply
don￿ t have the data to do this. Papers that use a parametric strategy include Jofre-Bonet and Pesendorfer
(2003) and Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2006). The latter follow our lead in using a parametric model with
unobserved heterogeneity.
21bi through his ￿rst-order condition for optimal bidding:







It is straightforward to construct an estimate of ￿i given our estimates of GL and GM: If
all sale characteristics (X;u;N;n) were observed, we would then be able to infer the bidder
value corresponding to each observed bid, and thus recover the value distributions (as in
Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong, 2000). As u is unobserved, however, we need to modify the
approach. As observed by Krasnokutskaya (2004), we can still recover the distributions




Figure 2 plots the density functions for logger and mill values for an auction with average
covariates, and u = 1, as well as the equilibrium bid functions assuming two mills and two
loggers participate in the auction. To compute the equilibrium bid functions, we combine the
￿tted bid distributions GL(￿jX;u;N;n) and GM(￿jX;u;N;n), assuming X = X, N = N, u =
1 and n = (2;2) with the ￿rst-order condition to ￿nd bk(vjX;u;N;n) = ￿
￿1
k (vjX;u;N;n).
As the Figure indicates, the distribution of mill values is substantially shifted rightward
from the distribution of logger values. Moreover, the estimated mill bid function is below
the logger bid function. Thus mills bid less than loggers for any given value, matching a key
prediction of the theoretical model.
It is also possible, by averaging across values of u, to estimate the typical markups built
into the sealed bids in our data. We estimate that in the Northern forests, the median pro￿t
margin across all bids is 9.5%. The corresponding number for California is 10.0%. These
margins, which are similar when we look separately at mills and loggers, suggest that the
sealed bidding is quite competitive.
Finally, we can use the estimated value distributions to investigate whether the equilib-
rium uniqueness condition in Proposition 1 holds for our calibrated model. Our parametric
model has the property that the e⁄ect of observed sale characteristics (X;N) is multiplica-
tively separable. This property that extends from the bids to the bidder values and hence
the bidder pro￿ts. So we can compute expected equilibrium pro￿ts for loggers and mills for
18A small subtlety here is that our theoretical model implies that the equilibrium bid distribution will have
a ￿nite upper bound. The Weibull distribution does not. For this reason, we truncate the very upper tail
of the estimated distributions GL(￿) and GM(￿) and work with the truncated distributions. The motivation
for this and details of the implementation are described in the Appendix.
22just a single set of sale characteristics (X;N) and simply re-scale to account for changes in
these characteristics.
To compute expected equilibrium pro￿ts, we repeatedly simulate the outcomes of sealed
bid auctions and average bidder pro￿ts over the simulations. In a given simulation, we
draw a value for the unobserved auction characteristic u, then sample for each bidder from
the estimated distributions GL;GM and infer the bidder values that correspond to these
draws. This leaves us with bidder values and equilibrium bids so we can identify the auction
winner and the realized bidder pro￿ts. We simulate 5000 auctions for each plausible level
of logger and mill participation (up to eight mills and twenty-￿ve loggers) to compute the
expected logger and mill pro￿ts, ￿s
L(X;N;n) and ￿s
M(X;N;n). These estimates have the
property that for all nL;nM, ￿s
M(X;N;nL;nM +1) > ￿s
L(X;N;nL;nM) for every tract in our
sample. Therefore Proposition 1 implies the calibrated model has a unique type-symmetric
equilibrium for every sale tract irrespective of the ￿xed cost of entry.
Estimating Entry Costs
The remaining parameter of the model is the entry cost, which we recover using the
equilibrium conditions for optimal entry behavior. As just explained, our estimated value
distributions imply a unique type-symmetric entry equilibrium with the property that if
there is logger entry with positive probability, all mills must enter with probability one. We
observe loggers entering 85% of sales in the Northern region and 88% in California, so for
these sales we can infer that the number of potential mill entrants equals the number of
observed mill entrants, i.e. NM = nM: For the sales with zero logger entrants, we also make
this same inference.19
As described above, we construct a measure of potential logger entry NL for each sale
by counting the number of loggers entering sales in the same area over the prior year. This
number strictly exceeds the number of observed logger entrants in virtually all the sales
(99% in the Northern region and 95% in California), indicating that the equilibrium needed
to rationalize the data is one in which loggers enter with probability strictly between zero
and one. In such an equilibrium, loggers must be just indi⁄erent between entering and not
entering. Letting ￿￿
L(X;N) denote the equilibrium pro￿t a logger expects from entering as
a function of observed sale characteristics (X;N) and the sale method ￿ 2 fo;sg, we have:
19It is possible that in some of these sales, the relevant equilibrium is one in which the loggers entered
with probability zero and perhaps not all mills entered. We assume this is not the case, and and perform a








L(X;N;n)Pr[njX;N;i 2 n;￿] = K(X;N): (9)
Here Pr[njX;N;i 2 n;￿] is the probability that n = (nL;nM) bidders enter given that i
enters.
Our estimated value distributions already provide an estimate of ￿￿
L(X;N;n). We use
the sealed bid data to construct an estimate of bidder￿ s beliefs about opponent entry. In
equilibrium, nM = NM, while loggers independently randomize their entry with identical
probability ps(X;N). The distribution of logger entry is therefore binomial, as is the distri-
bution of opponent entry. In particular,
Pr[nLjX;N;i 2 n;s] = p
s(X;N)
nL￿1 (1 ￿ p
s(X;N))
NL￿nL .




1 + exp(X￿X + N￿N)
:
We estimate the parameter vector ￿ by maximum likelihood using the observed logger entry
into sealed bid auctions. These estimates are reported in Table 4.20
Putting the estimated equilibrium pro￿t function ￿s
L(X;N;n) together with the estimated
probability of logger entry ps(X;N), we use (9) to compute the predicted logger pro￿ts
from a sealed bid auction, ￿s
L(X;N), as a function of the characteristics (X;N). Then,
treating each tract in our sample as an (X;N) pair, we impute for each tract an entry
cost K(X;N) = ￿s
L(X;N). We estimate a median entry cost of $2870 (s.e. $325) for the
Northern forests and $5056 (s.e. $673) for the California forests. As the costs of surveying
a tract can run to several thousand dollars, this seems reasonably consistent with our prior
beliefs about the costs of acquiring information.21;22
20With these estimates in hand, we can check if our assumption of that the probability of logger entry was
strictly positive even for the few tracts where we observe zero logger entry. If this were so, we should expect
the data to contain signi￿cantly more auctions with zero logger entry than is predicted by the binomial
model. They do not.
21As a point of comparison, we estimate that across tracts in our sample the median expected mill pro￿t
from a sealed bid auction is roughly $45,000 gross of entry costs.
22Our analysis assumes a type-symmetric entry equilibrium. A similar analysis is possible under the
assumption that potential entrants play a pure strategy entry equilibrium. In this case, the strong asymmetry
between mills and loggers ensures a unique number of mill and logger entrants for any entry cost, and we can
use revealed preference to obtain bounds on the ￿xed entry cost. Proceeding in this fashion, we obtain fairly
tight bounds on entry cost for each tract that are similar to the estimates we obtain under the assumption
of type-symmetric equilibrium.
24B. Comparing Predicted and Actual Outcomes
Having estimated the parameters of the theoretical model as functions of observable
sale characteristics, we now ask how closely the model￿ s equilibrium predictions match the
observed outcomes in our data. In the case of sealed bid sales, this exercise provides a
measure of how well we have ￿t the entry and bidding data. In the case of open auctions,
it allows us to ask whether the calibrated model can explain the open auction outcomes,
and in particular, whether assuming some degree of cooperative behavior provides a more
accurate ￿t to the data. Finally, by looking at both kinds of sales, we can assess whether
the model is able to explain not just the qualitative but the quantitative departures from
revenue equivalence documented earlier.
To generate sealed bidding predictions, our estimated model of logger entry gives the
equilibrium distribution of loggers who will participate in a sealed bid auction as a function
of tract characteristics. The number of mill entrants is known and not stochastic. We use
our estimates of GL;GM and the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity to predict bidding
behavior conditional on participation. Finally we combine the entry and bidding predictions
to predict outcomes conditional only on tract characteristics.
To generate open auction predictions, we observe that conditional on participation, each
entrant will bid his value and the auction price will equal the second highest value. Al-
ternatively, if mills collude, all but the highest value mill drop out immediately, and the
remaining bidders behave competitively. These observations allow us to calculate expected
prices and pro￿ts for a given tract and any given set of participants under the assumption
of either competitive and collusive behavior. In practice we do this by simulation. Each
simulation involves drawing a value of u, then drawing a value for each participant from
either FL(￿jX;u;N;n) or FM(￿jX;u;N;n), and ￿nally calculating the auction price, pro￿ts
and surplus.
This procedure gives predicted open auction outcomes for each tract conditional on any
hypothetical set of participants. To predict open auction entry, we assume a type-symmetric
equilibrium. For each tract we treat mill entry as known and equal to the set of potential
mill entrants. We calculate the unique logger entry probability that leaves each logger
just indi⁄erent between entering and not entering. This yields the unique equilibrium in
logger entry strategies that we combine with our equilibrium bidding predictions to generate
predicted outcomes as a function of observed tract characteristics. As was discussed in
Section 3, logger entry and auction allocation are the same regardless of whether mill behavior
is competitive or collusive; the only di⁄erence in outcomes is the predicted auction price.
25Table 5 reports the average outcomes in our data and the average outcomes predicted
by the parameterized model. We generate standard errors for the predicted outcomes using
a parametric bootstrap in which we re-sample from the asymptotic distribution of the bid
and entry distribution parameters reported in Table 4 and then repeat the procedure of
calculating expected auction outcomes for each bootstrap repetition.
For the Northern forests, the model closely predicts the average auction prices, the average
sale revenue and the fraction of sales that loggers win. For instance, the average sale price in
the data is $69.4, while the model predicts an average price of $70.4, and $69.9 conditional
on the set of participating bidders. The model also predicts the average sealed bids of
loggers and mills with reasonable accuracy. The results for the California forests are similarly
encouraging. The model closely matches the average logger and mill bids and the fraction
of sales won by loggers. Perhaps the biggest discrepancy between the model and the data
is that we somewhat overpredict the average sale price and revenue in California relative to
the observed outcomes. The average sale price in the data is $80.4, while the model predicts
$84.4, or $83.8 if we condition on the participating bidders.
As the model￿ s parameters are estimated from the sealed bid data, the tight match
between predicted and actual outcomes just ampli￿es our earlier point that the model ￿ts
well. The next step, however, provides a demanding test of the theory. We now use the model
to predict the outcomes of the open auctions and compare these predictions to the data. Here
we are asking the model to make predictions that are ￿out-of-sample￿in two senses: we are
predicting sale outcomes for tracts not used to estimate the model￿ s parameters, and we
are predicting the outcomes of a di⁄erent auction game than was observed in estimating the
model￿ s parameters. These predictions and actual outcomes are reported in the second panel
of Table 5.
Strikingly, the model predicts a level of logger entry in open auctions that is very close
to the actual level. In the Northern forests, the model predicts an average of 2.67 loggers
entering in equilibrium versus 2.75 in reality. In California, the model predicts 1.90 compared
to 1.95 in reality. These results indicate that the ￿tted model can explain the entry di⁄erences
between open and sealed bid sales in our data that were one of the key departures from
revenue equivalence The model is somewhat less successful in matching the fraction of open
auctions won by loggers. In both regions, the model under-predicts how often loggers win.
In the Northern forests, for instance, the model predicts loggers will win 54.4% of the open
sales, or 56.0% conditional on realized participation, while in reality they win 59.0%. There
is a similar discrepancy in California.
26Turning to the open auction prices, recall the we observed practically no di⁄erence be-
tween open and sealed bid prices in California and a sizeable di⁄erence in the Northern
forests. This observation was part of our motivation for introducing the possibility of open
auction collusion into our model. Table 5 shows that for the California forests, the compet-
itive model predicts open auction prices close to the actual prices. The average sale price in
the California open auctions was $85.1. Our ￿tted model predicts an average price of $87.2
conditional on realized entry, and $86.7 when we predict entry as well as bidding. The model
therefore seems to replicate our empirical ￿nding of little price di⁄erential due to the choice
of open or sealed bidding.
The situation is di⁄erent for the Northern forests where we observed a large price di⁄er-
ence between open and sealed auctions. The numbers in Table 5 indicate that observed open
auction prices are below the competitive prices predicted by the model, although well above
the fully collusive prediction. The competitive model predicts an average price of $67.8,
or $67.9 conditional on realized entry. The prediction falls to $44.2 under the assumption
that the mills fully collude. In fact, the average sale price across open auctions is $63.3 per
mbf. Accounting for sampling error, we reject both the competitive and collusive models at
conventional con￿dence levels. An assumption of mildly cooperative behavior on the part
of participating mills appears to provide a better match than either the competitive or fully
collusive extremes.
It is worth noting that this conclusion is not sensitive to our assumption that the sealed
bid auctions are competitive. If we assumed a degree of collusion in the sealed bid auctions,
we would infer a higher distribution of bidder values from the data. This would reinforce
the ￿nding that open auctions appear less than perfectly competitive. A possibility is that
there is collusion at a small fraction of the sales. We should note, however, that when we
looked at the open auctions for which the predicted price is substantially above the actual
price, we did not ￿nd any obvious pattern.
As statistical detection of collusion is known to be a di¢ cult problem (e.g. Bajari and
Ye, 2003), it is interesting to consider more re￿ned predictions of the collusive model. One
such prediction concerns the relationship between prices and the number of participating
mills. For sales with zero or one mill, the competitive and collusive model yield identical
predictions. Any e⁄ect of mill collusion should appear only in sales with more than two mills.
To explore this, we divide the sales in the Northern region into three groups: those with
zero participating mills, one participating mill, and two or more participating mills. Table 6
then reports the observed and predicted competitive prices for open and sealed sales falling
27into these categories. The striking result is that the competitive model predicts prices quite
accurately for sales with zero or one mill, but observed open auction prices fall well shy of
predicted competitive prices when there are two or more mills. This ￿nding indicates that
the price shortfall in Table 5 is driven entirely by sales with multiple mills, consistent with
the bidder collusion theory.
C. Quantifying the Trade-o⁄s in Auction Design
So far we have tried to assess if our theoretical model could explain the systematic
departures from revenue equivalence we observe in the data. We now take as given that we
have accurately estimated bidders￿values and entry costs, and we investigate the welfare
consequences of using either open or sealed bidding on an exclusive basis. From an a priori
standpoint, our theoretical results suggest that neither format will dominate. The open
auction conveys an e¢ ciency bene￿t in both entry and allocation, but the increase in social
surplus may come at the cost of lost revenue and an allocation that favors stronger bidders.
For this reason, it seems natural to try to quantify the trade-o⁄s faced in choosing between
the two formats.
To conduct a welfare comparison, we use our estimates of the primitives to compute
the predicted outcome of both an open auction and a sealed bid auction for each tract in
our sample. For each tract, and each auction format, we compute the expected entry, the
expected price and revenue, the probability that a logger will win, and the expected surplus
(the value of the winning bidder net of entry costs sunk by all the bidders). For the open
auction format, we consider two alternative speci￿cations of mill behavior: a benchmark
speci￿cation where mills behave competitively, and perhaps a more realistic speci￿cation
where they cooperate 18% of the time (18% being the number that rationalizes the observed
open auction prices in the Northern region).
Our comparisons are reported in Table 7, which reports expected auction outcomes taking
participation as ￿xed and solving for the complete entry equilibria under sealed and open
bidding. The top panel shows the results for the Northern forests, and the bottom panel for
California.
A ￿rst point that stands out is that if participation is assumed to be independent of the
auction format, the di⁄erences in equilibrium outcomes between open and sealed bidding
￿ assuming bidder behavior is competitive in both cases￿ are small, despite substantial
asymmetries among bidder types. Sealed bidding would generate more revenue, but the
revenue gain is only $320 per sale in the Northern region and $546 in California. Sealed
bidding also increases the probability that sales are won by loggers, but the average increase
28in probability is less than 1%. Finally, the e¢ ciency bene￿t to using an open auction format
is also quite small, less than $100 per sale in both regions.
These di⁄erences increase somewhat when we account for the fact that bidder participa-
tion will vary systematically with auction format. According to the model, sealed bid and
open auctions will attract the same number of mills, but sealed bid auctions will attract
between 3-4 more loggers for every 10 sales. One e⁄ect of this additional entry is to generate
a more substantial di⁄erence in the fraction of sales won by loggers ￿ we predict that loggers
would win 2-4% more sales with sealed bidding. A second e⁄ect is to increase the revenue
advantage of sealed bidding to roughly $3000 for the average sale in the Northern region and
$14,000 in California. Our estimate of the social surplus di⁄erential remains relatively small
in the for the Northern region, and is quite noisy for California, to the extent that our point
estimate indicates higher social surplus from sealed bidding, despite the fact that we know
equilibrium sealed bidding to be less e¢ cient.23
As a practical matter, however, the model suggests that these di⁄erences are dwarfed by
the potential e⁄ects of bidder collusion. In the Northern region, even if we take participation
as ￿xed, open bidding generates some $14,000 less per sale than competitive sealed bidding
if mills are able to engage in a mild amount of cooperative behavior. The di⁄erence is
over $17,000 once we account for participation e⁄ects. These numbers are even larger on
the California tracts. So to the extent that mild cooperation by mills at open auctions
is the behavioral assumption that receives the most support from our data in this region,
the revenue bene￿ts of sealed bidding clearly seem to be the most quantitatively signi￿cant
welfare consequence of the choice of auction method.
6. Conclusion
This paper has examined the relative performance of open and sealed bid auctions, using
U.S. Forest Service timber sales as a test case in auction design. We show that sealed bid
23The reason it is even possible to generate a positive point estimate here is that in practice we estimate
separate value distributions for each possible con￿guration of entrants (nL;nM) and these estimates are not
precisely the same. As noted earlier, this is an issue anytime one uses current two-stage auction estimation
methods. It becomes visible here because in modeling stochastic logger entry we need to take expectations
that average over possible numbers of logger entrants, where the weights on di⁄erent realizations of nL vary
across auction formats. Note that we could take the approach of averaging our value distribution estimates to
create a pooled estimate, but this has its own nontrivial problems. Notably, for any given set of participants
a pooled value distribution estimate does not correspond through the ￿rst order condition to the estimated
bid distribution. Moreover, because averaging the value distribution estimates leads to a distribution that
is ￿ atter than the individual estimates, the resulting sealed bid equilibrium does not match that well with
the observed data, which is a main reason why we pursued our current approach.
29auctions attract more small bidders, shift the allocation toward these bidders, and in some
forests generate higher revenue. We also show that an extension of the standard independent
private values auction that can explain these ￿ndings, both qualitatively and quantitatively,
and furthermore allows us to measure the degree of bidder competitiveness.
Our approach to structural estimation in this setting has two main features. First, mo-
tivated by a desire to match key features of the application, we incorporate several elements
(heterogeneous bidders, unobserved auction heterogeneity, and a model of bidder participa-
tion) that generally have received attention in isolation. Second, we exploit the variation in
auction format to assess the competitiveness of the open auction format. By relying only on
data from sealed bid auctions to estimate our primitives, we are able to make out-of-sample
predictions for open auctions that can be compared to actual outcomes.
Even though the role of asymmetries in determining optimal auction design have re-
ceived a fair amount of attention in the theoretical literature, our results show that with
￿xed participation, the choice of auction format has little impact even with substantial
asymmetries among bidders. When participation is endogenous, we see that sealed bidding
favors the small or weak bidders in both entry and allocation, and di⁄erences across auction
formats are magni￿ed. Finally, our results suggest that competitiveness may vary across
Forest Service regions, and that the implications of competitiveness for auction choice may
be quantitatively the most signi￿cant.
30Appendix I: Proofs of the Results
Proof of Proposition 1. Let i be a logger and j a mill. Given an entry pro￿le p, let
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From Li and Riley (1999), the bracketed term in (10) is no greater than ￿￿
L(l+1;m), while the










M(l + 1;m + 1)P(l;m). Therefore the assumed condition implies that
￿s
j(p) > ￿s
i(p) for any logger i and mill j and entry pro￿le p. Moreover, Maskin and Riley￿ s





j(p), so in addition ￿o
j(p) > ￿o
i(p). It follows that in any entry equilibrium, if
some logger enters with positive probability, then every mill strictly prefers to enter and will
enter with probability one. The remaining argument is straightforward. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof makes use of two key facts arising from the analysis
of Maskin and Riley (2000) and Li and Riley (1999). First, for any entry strategies p,
￿s
i(p) ￿ ￿o
i(p) for any logger i and ￿s
j(K) ￿ ￿o
j(p) for any mill j. Second, for either auction
format ￿ 2 fo;sg and any bidder i, ￿￿
i(p) is decreasing in p.
For a given vector of type-symmetric entry strategies p, let pL and pM denote the entry
probabilities of loggers and mills, and ￿￿
L(pL;pM), ￿￿
M(pL;pM) their expected pro￿ts from en-
try. Fix an auction format ￿. From above, if (pL;pM) and (p0
L;p0
M) are both type-symmetric
entry equilibria, and p0
M > pM, then p0
L < pL. So among type-symmetric entry equilibria,
there is one with the most mill entry and least logger entry. Finding this equilibrium is
straightforward. If ￿￿
L(0;1) < K, ￿nd the unique equilibrium with pL = 0 and pM ￿ 0. If
￿￿
L(0;1) ￿ K, ￿nd the unique equilibrium with pL ￿ 0 and pM = 1.
Using the ￿rst fact above, it is straightforward to check that the type-symmetric open
auction entry equilibrium with the most mill entry and least logger entry will have more
mill entry and less logger entry than the type-symmetric sealed auction equilibrium with the
most mill entry and least logger entry. This proves the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Let ￿c
i(p) denote the pro￿ts of bidder i from entering if mills
collude, and similarly for type-symmetric entry pro￿les de￿ne ￿c
L(pL;pM) and ￿c
M(pL;pM) as






i(p) is decreasing in p for any bidder i. Therefore we can use precisely the
argument from the above proof to show that the type-symmetric collusive open auction
entry equilibrium with the most mill entry and least logger entry will have more mill entry
and less logger entry than the corresponding type-symmetric competitive open auction entry
equilibrium. Q.E.D.
31Appendix II: Omitted Details of the Structural Model.
A. The Likelihood Function
A useful property of Gamma-Weibull models is that the unobserved heterogeneity can
be integrated out analytically. This leads to the following log-likelihood for auction t:






































Here ￿ is the Gamma variance, b1t;:::;b(nLt+nMt)t are the observed bids in auction t, and
￿it;pit are the Weibull parameters for bidder i in auction t. As de￿ned in the text, these
are functions of (Xt;Nt;nt), the unknown parameter vectors ￿ and ￿, and bidder i￿ s type ￿
logger or mill.
B. Truncating the Bid Distributions
Our independent private values model predicts that the equilibrium bid distributions
will have ￿nite support. If, for example, there are two bidders of the same type, b = E[v].
Therefore, modeling the bid distribution as Weibull implicitly imposes an in￿nite mean on
bidder values. We view this problem as largely technical because it results from a very small
fraction of large bids being rationalized with implausibly high values. Our solution therefore
is to truncate the estimated bid distributions.24
To identify maximum bids at which to truncate, we exploit two facts. First, truncating the
bid distribution does not a⁄ect the reverse hazard rate gk=GK, and hence leaves the estimated
inverse bid function ￿(￿), de￿ned in (8), unchanged for bid values below the truncation.
Second, the estimated bid function ￿
￿1(￿) becomes very ￿ at for high bidder values. This
means that if we use our prior knowledge of timber auctions to specify a plausible maximum
value and use the estimated bid function to locate the implied maximum bid, our resulting
truncation point will be relatively insensitive to the precise maximum value we specify.
To make this operational, we observe that values in our model take the form: vit =
exp(Xt￿X + Nt￿N) ￿ ￿it. Let X = EXt[Xt] and N = ENt[Nt]. We assume that for the
￿stronger￿bidder type in a given auction (i.e. mills if any are present, otherwise loggers)
exp(X￿X+N￿N)]￿￿it ￿ 500, so that for the average tract in our sample, the highest possible
value is $500 per mbf. This assumption implies an upper bound on the value distribution
vt(Xt;ut;Nt):




24An alternative would be to specify directly a bid distribution with ￿nite support, but this has serious
pitfalls as well because it requires estimating the maximum bid conditional on observed and unobserved
covariates. This is a hard problem, and moreover the mean of bidder values will be in close correspondence
with the (arguably poor) estimate.
32For an auction with a set nt of participants, the bid resulting from this maximum value,
b(Xt;ut;Nt;nt), satis￿es:
￿M(b(Xt;ut;Nt;nt);Xt;ut;Nt;nt) = vk(Xt;ut;Nt):
We calculate b(￿) numerically for each (Xt;ut;Nt;nt) and truncate the bid distribution. If
both mills and loggers participate, this truncation also impose an upper bound on logger
values, one that may be below v(￿). In practice, we end up truncating only a very small
fraction of the bid distribution. In the auction plotted in Figure 2, for instance, less than
1% of mill bids and 0.001% of logger bids are truncated.
A slight concern with our procedure is that the truncation is imposed after we estimate
the bid distribution. One way to view what we do is as the ￿rst step of an iterative process
where we repeatedly estimate the bid distributions, calculate b(X;u;N;n), and then re-
estimate the bid distributions imposing the new truncation. Because our one-step procedure
leads us to truncate such a small fraction of bids, we believe that iterating the procedure
would lead to extremely similar estimates.
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36Full Sample Selected Full Sample
N 886 732 347 339
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Auction Outcomes
Winning Bid ($/mbf) 61.82 43.84 63.27 44.91 69.45 46.64 69.42 46.63
Entrants 4.07 2.41 4.13 2.44 4.37 2.81 4.40 2.83
  # Loggers Entering 2.53 2.43 2.75 2.46 3.18 2.57 3.23 2.57
  # Mills Entering 1.53 1.70 1.38 1.68 1.19 1.74 1.17 1.74
  Fraction Loggers Entering 0.59 0.40 0.64 0.39 0.75 0.34 0.76 0.33
Logger Wins Auction 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.47
Appraisal Variables
Volume of timber (hundred mbf) 32.00 43.06 23.02 34.30 16.70 30.01 14.65 25.50
Reserve Price ($/mbf) 24.70 24.66 25.68 25.46 26.65 24.30 26.64 24.44
Selling Value ($/mbf) 252.60 131.88 253.04 130.67 259.44 125.05 259.35 125.33
Road Construction ($/mbf) 5.86 9.57 4.36 8.69 2.94 7.61 2.71 7.44
No Road Construction 0.59 0.49 0.68 0.47 0.78 0.42 0.79 0.41
Logging Costs ($/mbf) 79.87 64.40 78.61 64.49 79.86 63.42 79.60 63.61
Manufacturing Costs ($/mbf) 108.82 85.81 107.53 86.09 112.75 87.03 112.65 87.38
Sale Characteristics
Contract Length (months) 23.02 17.93 22.19 16.35 16.78 14.72 15.94 13.38
Species Herfindal 0.61 0.28 0.61 0.28 0.59 0.27 0.59 0.27
Density of Timber (mbf/acres) 7.83 7.01 7.85 7.20 8.91 8.21 8.97 8.26
Salvage Sale 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48 0.40 0.49 0.41 0.49
Scale Sale 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.37 0.48 0.36 0.48
Quarter of Sale 2.43 0.99 2.45 0.99 2.47 0.98 2.47 0.98
Year of Sale 86.32 2.41 86.32 2.45 85.95 2.61 85.94 2.61
Housing Starts 1557.53 255.73 1572.33 235.52 1542.04 274.69 1540.41 275.81
Potential Competition
Logging companies in county 44.41 20.88 43.17 21.32 41.48 22.00 41.73 22.10
Sawmills in County 8.67 4.32 8.45 4.35 7.67 4.26 7.56 4.15
Active Loggers (active in District 
in prior 12 months) 20.14 9.71 19.91 9.71 19.24 8.90 19.47 8.86
Active Manufacturers (active in 
District  in prior 12 months) 5.20 2.14 5.25 2.20 5.77 2.47 5.79 2.48
Selected
Table 1A: Summary Statistics for Northern Sales
Open Auctions Sealed AuctionsOpen Auctions Sealed Auctions
Full Sample Selected Full Sample
N 1290 325 774 382
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Auction Outcomes
Winning Bid ($/mbf) 91.23 143.40 85.10 102.93 79.25 61.90 80.39 63.20
Entrants 4.08 2.35 3.72 2.24 3.74 2.57 4.27 2.76
  # Loggers Entering 1.33 1.58 1.95 1.89 2.81 2.22 3.01 2.35
  # Mills Entering 2.75 1.90 1.77 1.77 0.94 1.41 1.26 1.57
  Fraction Loggers Entering 0.32 0.33 0.55 0.39 0.78 0.31 0.73 0.31
Logger Wins Auction 0.26 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.74 0.44 0.67 0.47
Appraisal Variables
Volume of timber (hundred mbf) 67.26 50.41 23.77 24.14 9.22 17.68 11.24 12.45
Reserve Price ($/mbf) 36.79 36.72 37.31 49.64 36.07 32.48 33.26 32.28
Selling Value ($/mbf) 270.83 99.48 233.41 143.15 246.92 251.63 239.72 119.74
Road Construction ($/mbf) 9.67 12.58 4.39 9.76 1.09 4.31 1.58 5.23
No Road Construction 0.32 0.46 0.64 0.48 0.90 0.29 0.87 0.34
Logging Costs ($/mbf) 108.28 44.78 88.42 58.59 86.56 56.74 97.73 58.49
Manufacturing Costs ($/mbf) 122.74 42.85 100.02 61.11 99.62 62.89 104.93 60.28
Sale Characteristics
Contract Length (months) 27.54 14.57 16.23 10.34 10.24 7.46 11.97 6.78
Species Herfindal 0.56 0.23 0.59 0.25 0.60 0.24 0.61 0.25
Density of Timber (mbf/acres) 11.54 14.75 11.93 16.94 18.38 220.16 11.37 15.83
Salvage Sale 0.13 0.34 0.24 0.43 0.36 0.48 0.25 0.43
Scale Sale 0.90 0.30 0.75 0.44 0.66 0.47 0.75 0.43
Quarter of Sale 2.37 1.02 2.58 1.00 2.71 0.89 2.62 0.96
Year of Sale 85.26 2.12 85.58 2.29 85.61 2.29 85.07 2.15
Housing Starts 1593.72 254.02 1564.30 235.05 1559.08 247.12 1578.31 264.04
Potential Competition
Logging companies in county 21.76 18.30 20.75 18.66 20.00 17.39 21.09 19.00
Sawmills in County 6.28 6.05 5.77 5.08 6.00 6.13 6.70 7.45
Active Loggers (active in Forest 
in prior 12 months) 10.32 7.08 10.11 6.86 10.48 5.98 11.29 6.62
Active Manufacturers (active in 
Forest  in prior 12 months) 5.99 3.34 5.42 3.54 5.26 2.76 5.48 2.85
Selected
Table 1B: Summary Statistics for California SalesTable 2: Choice of Sale Method
Dependent Variable: Dummy if auction is sealed bid (Logit regression)
  (1)  (2)
  Northern California
coefficient s.e. coefficient s.e.
Appraisal Controls
Ln(Reserve Price) -0.063 (0.115) -0.157 (0.145)
Ln(Selling Value) 0.085 (0.110) -0.129 (0.111)
Ln(Logging Costs) 0.060 (0.468) -1.159 (0.491)
Ln(Manufacturing Costs) 0.230 (0.717) 0.343 (0.158)
Ln(Road Costs) -0.176 (0.086) -0.129 (0.100)
Other Sale Characteristics
ln(Contract Length/volume) -0.756 (4.726) -6.943 (6.317)
Species Herfindal -0.211 (0.434) -0.590 (0.427)
Density of Timber (hmbf/acres) -1.185 (1.061) 0.042 (0.107)
Salvage Sale (Dummy) 0.112 (0.176) 0.099 (0.242)
Scale Sale (Dummy) 0.328 (0.198) -0.729 (0.269)
ln(Monthly US House Starts) -1.168 (1.038) -4.216 (1.226)
Volume Controls (Dummy Variables):
Volume: 1.5-3 hundred mbf -0.115 (0.339) -1.685 (0.600)
Volume: 3-5 -0.327 (0.360) -2.262 (0.631)
Volume: 5-8 -0.411 (0.382) -2.728 (0.657)
Volume: 8-12 -0.744 (0.410) -3.458 (0.688)
Volume: 12-20 -0.847 (0.405) -3.832 (0.700)
Volume: 20-40 -1.477 (0.461) -7.045 (0.762)
Volume: 40-65 -1.758 (0.517) -8.085 (0.802)
Volume: 65-90 -1.378 (0.550) -8.796 (0.877)
Volume: 90+ -2.479 (0.583) -9.833 (0.930)
Potential Competition
ln(Loggers in County) -0.089 (0.277) 0.972 (0.214)
ln(Sawmills in County) 0.254 (0.358) -1.048 (0.279)
ln(Active Loggers) 0.212 (0.177) 0.189 (0.111)
ln(Active Manufacturers) -0.082 (0.120) 0.164 (0.095)
Additional Controls (Dummy Variables)
Chi-Squared Statistics (p-value in parenthesis)
Years 35.96 (0.005) 68.01 (0.000)
Quarters 4.71 (0.195) 4.48 (0.214)
Species 14.67 (0.401) 12.59 (0.127)
Location 114.77 (0.000) 139.96 (0.000)
 N=1233 N=2064
LR chi2 (68) 283.24 LR chi2 (55) 1801.07
P-value 0.000 P-value 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.19 Pseudo-R2 0.66(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
ln(Logger Entry) ln(Mill Entry) Loggers/Entrants Logger Wins ln(Price) ln(Price)
1
Regression with No Interactions Between Sealed and Covariates
2
0.089 -0.014 0.056 0.039 0.094 0.055
(0.036) (0.030) (0.016) (0.026) (0.038) (0.032)
Regression with Interactions Between Sealed and All Covariates
0.097 -0.010 0.058 0.038 0.099 0.060
(0.036) (0.031) (0.016) (0.027) (0.039) (0.033)
0.100 0.018 0.052 0.034 0.118 0.091
(0.048) (0.053) (0.029) (0.039) (0.064) (0.055)
Regression with No Interactions Between Sealed and Covariates
2
0.101 -0.026 0.058 0.036 0.027 -0.026
(0.045) (0.038) (0.020) (0.036) (0.051) (0.040)
Regression with Interactions Between Sealed and All Covariates
0.099 -0.022 0.056 0.035 0.026 -0.037
(0.044) (0.038) (0.020) (0.035) (0.050) (0.039)
0.106 -0.123 0.097 0.107 -0.038 0.005
(0.062) (0.067) (0.034) (0.051) (0.127) (0.087)
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses, matching standard errors computed following Abadie and Imbens (2006) 




Table 3: Effect of Auction Method on Sale Outcomes
Panel A: Northern Sales (N= 1071 Sales)
Sealed Bid Effect
Sealed Bid Effect on Sample
2. See Appendix Tables 1A and 2A for full set of controls and coefficients. 
3. Number of matches = 4 using the estimated propensity score.
1. Specification includes number of entering mills and loggers in addition to sale controls.
Matching Estimate
3
Sealed Bid Effect on Sample
Panel B: California Sales (N= 707 Sales)
Sealed Bid Effect
Sealed Bid Effect on SampleTable 4: Bid and Entry Distributions for Sealed Auctions
  (1) (2)   (1) (2)
  Bid Distribution   Logger Entry   Bid Distribution   Logger Entry
coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
Ln(Reserve Price) 0.404 (0.034) -0.314 (0.057) 0.602 (0.037) -0.388 (0.061)
Ln(Selling Value) -0.037 (0.027) 0.025 (0.068) -0.021 (0.024) -0.037 (0.051)
Ln(Manufacturing Costs) 1.034 (0.180) 1.255 (0.318) 0.014 (0.032) 0.194 (0.065)
Ln(Logging Costs) -0.480 (0.164) -0.934 (0.234) -0.209 (0.109) -1.401 (0.206)
Ln(Road Costs) 0.001 (0.025) -0.148 (0.047) -0.013 (0.023) -0.175 (0.062)
Species Herfindal -0.124 (0.103) -0.301 (0.176) -0.200 (0.084) -0.445 (0.170)
Density of Timber (hmbf/acres) -0.009 (0.003) -0.006 (0.005) -0.003 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003)
Salvage Sale (Dummy) -0.005 (0.045) -0.011 (0.080) -0.019 (0.049) -0.417 (0.102)
Scale Sale (Dummy) -0.008 (0.053) -0.161 (0.090) 0.133 (0.056) 0.219 (0.104)
Ln(Volume) -0.063 (0.028) -0.284 (0.051) -0.041 (0.032) -0.307 (0.063)
No Mill Entrants (Dummy) -0.120 (0.068) -0.460 (0.117) -0.089 (0.059) -0.433 (0.120)
Min(Mill Entrants,5) 0.091 (0.022) -0.059 (0.045) 0.072 (0.020) -0.053 (0.047)
Active Loggers -0.041 (0.006) -0.050 (0.007)
Min(Logger Entrants,5) 0.034 (0.016) 0.074 (0.014)
Mill (Dummy) 0.284 (0.032) 0.160 (0.026)
Mill (Dummy) * (Mill Entrants=1) -0.109 (0.073) -0.128 (0.052)
Additional Controls
No Mill Entrants (Dummy) -0.081 (0.070) -0.202 (0.070)
Min(Mill Entrants,5) 0.015 (0.022) -0.009 (0.022)
Min(Logger Entrants,5) 0.016 (0.018) -0.005 (0.015)
Mill(Dummy) 0.074 (0.066) -0.031 (0.052)
Mill (Dummy) * (Mill Entrants=1) -0.386 (0.122) -0.076 (0.100)
Constant 1.134 (0.103) 1.329 (0.090)
Constant -0.502 (0.120) -0.416 (0.124)
N = 382
Note: Bid distribution estimated from sales with two or more bidders.









Forest, Year, Species 
Dummies
α α ln(λ) ln(λ)
Panel A: Northern Sales Panel B: California
(Weibull) (Binomial) (Weibull) (Binomial)Table 5: Actual Outcomes vs. Outcomes Predicted by Model
  (1)   (2)   (3)
   Predicted  Predicted
N Actual
Avg. Bid 1492 59.6 58.2 (1.4) 57.4 (1.3)
Avg. Logger Bid 1096 50.8 48.7 (1.4) 47.4 (1.4)
Avg. Mill Bid 396 83.8 84.7 (2.7) 85.2 (2.7)
Avg. Sale Price ($/mbf) 339 69.4 69.9 (1.4) 70.4 (1.6)
Avg. Revenue ($000s) 339 111.4 108.1 (4) 109.9 (4.2)
% Sales won by Loggers 339 68.1 68.0 (0.90) 65.0 (0.01)
Avg. Logger Entry 339 3.23 3.23 (0.09) ()
Avg. Sale Price (Competition) 732 63.3 67.9 (1.8) 67.8 (2.1)
Avg. Sale Price (Collusion) 732 63.3 44.2 (1.3) 44.1 (2.2)
Avg. Revenue (Competition) 732 144.7 152.7 (6.8) 154.8 (7.9)
Avg. Revenue (Collusion) 732 144.7 61.0 (2) 64.7 (5.0)
% Sales won by Loggers 732 59.0 56.0 (0.01) 54.4 (0.02)
Avg. Logger Entry 732 2.75 2.67 (0.17)
Avg. Bid 1630 73.6 74.7 (2.3) 74.2 (2.3)
Avg. Logger Bid 1150 64.0 63.6 (2.1) 62.3 (2.4)
Avg. Mill Bid 480 96.5 101.2 (3.5) 102.8 (3.8)
Avg. Sale Price ($/mbf) 382 80.4 83.8 (2.1) 84.4 (2.4)
Avg. Revenue ($000s) 382 103.1 110.7 (3.8) 111.9 (4.0)
% Sales won by Loggers 382 66.8 66.4 (1.2) 62.6 (1.3)
Avg. Logger Entry 382 3.01 3.01 (0.07)
Avg. Sale Price (Competition) 325 85.1 87.2 (2.7) 86.7 (3.1)
Avg. Sale Price (Collusion) 325 85.1 46.1 (1.2) 51.0 (1.6)
Avg. Revenue (Competition) 325 227.0 244.7 (9.7) 242.4 (10.9)
Avg. Revenue (Collusion) 325 227.0 93.2 (2.6) 112.9 (5.6)
% Sales won by Loggers 325 50.5 48.2 (1.1) 43.6 (1.8)





Panel B: California Sales
Panel A: Northern Sales
Sealed Bid Sales
(bidding + entry)  (1)   (2)   (3)
   Predicted   Predicted
N Actual (bidding only) (bidding + entry)
Sealed Bid Sales 181 51.7 51.4 51.4
Open Auction Sales 321 49.8 50.5 47.1
Sealed Bid Sales 70 66.8 64.6 66.9
Open Auction Sales 150 50.0 52.2 59.5
Sealed Bid Sales 88 108.1 112.1 112.2
Open Auction Sales 261 87.5 98.5 98.0
Note: Average sale prices are for Northern region tracts.
Table 6: Actual versus Predicted Sale Prices by Mill Participation 
One Mill
Two or More Mills
Zero Mills(1) (2)   (4)  
Sealed Open Open
(Comp.) (Part. Coll.)
Avg. Sale Price ($/mbf) 68.56 68.53 0.03 (0.04) 64.58 3.98 (0.24)
Avg. Sale Revenue ($000s) 138.33 138.64 -0.32 (0.06) 124.33 14.00 (1.22)
Avg. Sale Surplus ($000s) 176.99 177.06 -0.08 (0.02)
% Sales Won by Loggers 60.14 59.68 0.46 (0.162)
Avg. Sale Price ($/mbf) 69.68 68.19 1.49 (0.71) 64.11 5.57 (0.82)
Avg. Sale Revenue ($000s) 143.04 139.87 3.17 (2.24) 125.32 17.72 (2.74)
Avg. Sale Surplus ($000s) 156.53 156.84 -0.30 (2.70)
% Sales Won by Loggers 59.65 57.19 2.46 (0.00)
Logger Entry 3.10 2.76 0.34 (0.12)
Avg. Sale Price ($/mbf) 85.53 85.20 0.32 (0.07) 79.39 6.13 (0.39)
Avg. Sale Revenue ($000s) 172.64 172.10 0.55 (0.13) 154.43 18.21 (1.36)
Avg. Sale Surplus ($000s) 203.61 203.65 -0.04 (0.02)
% Sales Won by Loggers 58.21 57.81 0.40 (0.002)
Avg. Sale Price ($/mbf) 88.36 83.76 4.60 (2.26) 78.55 9.81 (2.21)
Avg. Sale Revenue ($000s) 182.38 168.20 14.18 (5.43) 152.83 29.55 (5.39)
Avg. Sale Surplus ($000s) 181.82 170.58 11.24 (6.86)
% Sales Won by Loggers 55.84 52.66 3.18 (0.01)
Logger Entry 2.72 2.35 0.37 (0.14)
Note: Each entry is an average prediction over all tracts in the sample. Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Exogenous Entry
Endogenous Entry
Panel A: Northern Sales (N=1071)





Table 7: Welfare Effects of Sealed vs. Open Auctions
Difference Difference
(5)
Sealed - Open 
  
 